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Abstract
Poisoning attacks have emerged as a significant security threat to machine learning (ML) algo-
rithms. It has been demonstrated that adversaries who make small changes to the training set, such
as adding specially crafted data points, can hurt the performance of the output model. Most of these
attacks require the full knowledge of training data or the underlying data distribution. In this paper
we study the power of oblivious adversaries who do not have any information about the training set.
We show a separation between oblivious and full-information poisoning adversaries. Specifically, we
construct a sparse linear regression problem for which LASSO estimator is robust against oblivious
adversaries whose goal is to add a non-relevant features to the model with certain poisoning budget.
On the other hand, non-oblivious adversaries, with the same budget, can craft poisoning examples
based on the rest of the training data and successfully add non-relevant features to the model.
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1 Introduction
Traditional approach to supervised machine learning focuses on a benign setting; honestly sampled train-
ing data, perhaps with random noise, is given to a learner that outputs a model that will later get tested on
the same data distribution used during the learning phase. Due to the broad deployment of learning algo-
rithms in safety-critical applications, however, recently machine learning has gone through a revolution
of studying the same problem under so-called adversarial settings. Researchers have investigated several
types of attacks, including test-time (a.k.a., evasion attacks finding adversarial examples) (Szegedy et al.,
2014; Biggio et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Shafahi et al., 2018), training-time attacks (a.k.a.,
poisoning or causative attacks) (Barreno et al., 2006; Biggio et al., 2012; Papernot et al., 2016a), back-
door attacks (Turner et al., 2018; Gu et al., 2017), membership inference attacks (Shokri et al., 2017),
etc. In response, the machine learning researchers have put forth several defenses (Papernot et al.,
2016b; Madry et al., 2018; Biggio & Roli, 2018) and new adaptive attacks (Carlini & Wagner, 2017;
Athalye et al., 2018; Tramer et al., 2020) that circumvent some of the propose defences.
The central focus of this work is on understanding the power of poisoning adversaries, when it comes
to adversary’s information about the data set. Specifically, in a poisoning attack, an adversary changes a
training set S of examples into a “similar” training set S ′ (usually measured by Hamming distance; i.e.,
the number of examples removed and/or added). The goal of the adversary could, generally speaking,
be to degrade the “quality” of the learned model, where the term quality here could be interpreted in
different ways. For example, one goal could be to increase the population risk of the resulting model
θ′ that the learner generates from the (poisoned) data S ′ (compared with what would have been output
θ based on S). A different goal could be to make θ′ fail on a particular test set of adversary’s interest,
making it a targeted poisoning (Barreno et al., 2006; Shen et al., 2016) or increase the probability of a
general “Boolean bad property” of θ (Mahloujifar et al., 2019a; Mahloujifar & Mahmoody, 2019).
What does the adversary know about the data? Previous work on theoretical analysis of poisoning
attacks implicitly, or explicitly, assume that the adversary has full knowledge of the training data S before
choosing what examples to add or delete from S . For example, the adversary in universal targeted data
poisoning attacks of Mahloujifar et al. (2019a); Mahloujifar & Mahmoody (2019) which is based on the
(computational) concentration of measure in product spaces, needs to start off by knowing the full data
set S and then select, one by one, whether or not to change each particular example in S . Similarly, the
attacks described in work of Koh et al. (2018), construct poisoning datasets based on the knowledge of
the “clean” training data. This assumption about the “full information” about S given to the poisoning
adversary, however, is not realistic in all scenarios, as adversary might not have access to all of the data
before deciding on what part of it to tamper with.
An example scenario: distributed learning. As a particular practical example where a poisoning
adversary might naturally have limited information about (most of) training data, consider a feder-
ated (or any form of distributed) learning system McMahan & Ramage (2017); McMahan et al. (2016);
Bonawitz et al. (2017); Konecˇny` et al. (2016) between multiple hospitals who share their data with a
trusted server with the goal of training a shared model over their aggregate data. Now one can imagine
an adversary who wants to participate in this system and inject malicious data with the hope of degrading
the quality of the trained model. In such scenario, the adversary might only know the examples that it
would submit itself, and not the examples submitted by other hospitals, given that they only share their
data with the trusted server. In this case, we are dealing with an oblivious poisoning adversary.
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Main question: are full-information attacks stronger? Motivated by understanding the role of the
knowledge about the data set by a poisoning adversary, in this work, we directly study whether having
full information can help a poisoning attacker. Namely, we study whether there is a learning task in
which oblivious poisoning adversaries who might only know the trained model θ (but not the entire
training data S that has led to θ) are provably weaker than full-information adversaries who know the
entire data set S (in addition to perhaps knowing the model θ).
A new motivation for privacy. Privacy is often viewed as a utility for data owners in the machine
learning pipeline. Due to the trade-offs between privacy and the utility of the users, data users some-
times ignore the privacy of data owners while doing their analysis, specially when they do not have any
incentive to preserve the privacy. A positive answer to the main question posed above could create a new
motivation for keeping training dataset private. Specifically, the users of data would try to keep training
dataset private, with the goal of securing their models against poisoning and increasing their own utility.
1.1 Our Contribution
In this work, we initiate a formal study of the role of adversary’s knowledge in poisoning attacks by
comparing the two extreme points: full information vs. oblivious attacks. In particular, we study the
provable difference that it makes when the adversary knows all of the training data before launching
the poisoning attack, called the full-information threat model, in contrast to when the adversary adds
malicious data to the training set in an oblivious way.
We prove our separation between the power of the two poisoning adversarial models through a novel
study of poisoning attacks in the context of model recovery, and specifically for a sparse linear regression
problem. In a model recovery problem, the learning algorithm wants to discover the relevant features that
determine the ground truth function. For example, imagine a dataset of patients with many features, who
suffer from an specific disease with different levels of severity. One can try to find the most important
features contributing to the severity of disease in the context of model recovery. Specifically, the learners’
goal here is to recover a vector θ∗ ∈ Rp whose non-zero coordinates determine the relevant features
contributing to the disease. In this scenario, the goal of the adversary is to deceit the learning process
and make it output a model θˆ′ ∈ Rp with a different set of non-zero coordinates.
As motivation for studying model recovery under adversarial perturbations, note that the non-zero
coordinates of the learned model θˆ (denoted by θˆ′, in case of an attacker being involved) could define a
sensitive information. For example, in the patient data example, the adversary might be a pharmaceutical
institute who tries to imply that a non-relevant feature is contributing to the disease, in order to advertise
for a specific medicine. To the best of our knowledge, all previous poisoning attacks were studied in
settings where the goal of the adversary was to increase the population risk or the probability of a bad
property (e.g., failing on a particular test example in the context of targeted poisoning). Therefore, study-
ing poisoning attacks in the context of model recovery is also a novel contribution of our investigation.
More specifically, we construct a (regression) model recovery problem in which a matrixX ∈ Rn×p
that consists of n examples of dimension p are linearly mapped to p real numbers Y = X × θ∗ +W
where θ∗ is the ground truth andW is Gaussian noise. We study full-information vs. oblivious attackers
against Lasso, where the model is simply the output to the following optimization problem:
θˆ = argmin
θ
1
n
· ‖Y −X × θ‖22 +
2λ
n
· ‖θ‖1
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where λ is Lasso’s parameter. We show that by choosing λ and the distribution of the (rows of) X
appropriately, the following could be proved for the two types of poisoning adversaries. There is a full-
information poisoning adversary who adds a single row toX and makes θ′ contain a non-zero coordinate
in an arbitrary location (chosen by the adversary). On the other hand, any oblivious adversary with
“budget” o(
√
n) who adds an arbitrary set of o(
√
n) rows to X, only based on the knowledge of θˆ, is
unable to change the support set of the re-trained model θ′ based on the poisoned data set. Note that, it is
even natural to consider oblivious attacks that do not know the original honestly recovered model θˆ, and
giving this knowledge to an oblivious attack (and yet proving its limit) only makes our results stronger.
1.2 Related Work
As opposed to data poisoning setting, the question of adversary’s knowledge is previously studied in the
line of work on adversarial examples. In a test time evasion attack the adversary’s goal is to find an
adversarial example, the adversary knows the input x fully before trying to find a close input x′ x that
is misclassified. In that setting, the question of adversary’s knowledge can be formed around whether or
not it knows the model θ completely or it only has a black-box access to it (Papernot et al., 2017). Note
that, in our work, the model θ is known to the adversary, and the information complexity of the attack
focuses on whether or not the adversary is aware of the full training data.
Some previous work have studied poisoning attacks in the setting of federated/distributed learn-
ing (Bhagoji et al., 2019; Mahloujifar et al., 2019b). Their attacks, however, either (implicitly) assume
a full (or partial) information attacker, or aim to increase the population risk (as opposed to injecting
features in a model recovery task). Thus, our work is novel in both formally studying the differences
between full-information vs. oblivious attacks, and tackling it in the context of model recovery.
We also distinguish our work with another line of work that studies the computational complexity
of the attacker (Mahloujifar & Mahmoody, 2018; Garg et al., 2019). Here, we study the “information
complexity” of the attack; namely, what information the attacker needs to succeed in a poisoning attack,
while those works study the computational resources that a poisoning attacker needs to successfully
degrade the quality of the learned model. Another recent exciting line of work that studies the com-
putational aspect of robust learning in poisoning contexts, focuses on the computational complexity of
the learning process itself (Charikar et al., 2017; Diakonikolas et al., 2017, 2018b,a; Prasad et al., 2018;
Diakonikolas et al., 2018c), and other works have studied the same question about the complexity of the
learning process for evasion attacks (Bubeck et al., 2018b,a; Degwekar & Vaikuntanathan, 2019).
Finally, we remark that online poisoning adversaries studied in Mahloujifar & Mahmoody (2017);
Wang & Chaudhuri (2018); Mahloujifar & Mahmoody (2019), roughly speaking, is a form of attack that
lies somewhere between oblivious and full-information attacks. In their model, an online adversary needs
to choose its decision about the ith example (i.e., to tamper or not tamper it) based only on the history of
the first i − 1 examples, and without the knowledge of the future examples. So, their knowledge about
the training data is limited, in a partial way. Since we separate the power of full information vs. oblivious
attacks, a corollary of our results is that at least one of these models is different from the online variant
for recovering sparse linear regression. In other words, we are in one of the following worlds: (i) online
adversaries are provably stronger than oblivious adversaries or (ii) full-information (offline) adversaries
are provably stronger than online adversaries.
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Organization. In Section 2, we give the basic definitions of the problem setting in the model recovery
with Lasso estimator. In Section 3, we present the formal threat models of poisoning attacks in the full-
information and oblivious settings in the context of model recovery with Lasso estimator. In Section 4,
we formally prove our separation between the two threat models by proving the power of full-information
attacks and limits on the power of oblivious attacks with the same tampering budget. In Section 5, we
end with some concluding remarks and discussion of future work.
2 Model Recovery with Lasso Estimator
Notation. For an arbitrary vector θ ∈ Rp we use Supp(θ) = {i : θi 6= 0}, we denote the set of (indices
of) its non-zero coordinates of θ ∈ Rp. We also use ‖θ‖2 and ‖θ‖ to denote the ℓ2 ℓ1 norm of θ
respectively. For two matrices X ∈ Rn×p and Y ∈ Rn×1, we use [X Y ] ∈ Rn×(p+1) to denote a set of
n regression observations on feature vectorsXi∈[n] such that Yi is the real-valued observation forXi. For
two matrices X1 ∈ Rn1×p and X2 ∈ Rn2×p, we use
[
X1
X2
]
∈ R(n1+n2)×p to denote the concatenation
of X1 and X2. Similarly, for two set of observations
[
X1 Y1
] ∈ Rn1×(p+1) and [X2 Y2] ∈ Rn2×(p+1),
we use
[
X1 X2
Y1 Y2
]
∈ R(n1+n2)×(p+1) to denote the concatenation of [X1 Y1] and [X2 Y2].
Problem setting. We work in the model recovery setting, and the exact format of our problem is as
follows. There is a target parameter vector θ∗ ∈ (0, 1)p. We have a n × p matrix X (n vectors, each
of p features) and we have Y = X × θ∗ +W where W itself is a small noise, and Y is the vector of
noisy observations about θ∗. Number of non-zero elements (denoting the actual relevant features) in θ∗
are bounded by s namely, Supp(θ∗) ≤ s. For the setting of the problem mentioned above, the Lasso
Estimator tries to learn θ∗ by optimizing the a penalized loss and obtain the solution θˆ as follows.
θˆ = argmin
θ∈(0,1)p
1
n
· ‖Y −X × θ‖22 +
2λ
n
· ‖θ‖1.
We use Lasso(
[
X Y
]
) to denote θˆ, as learned by the Lasso optimization described above. We also
use ℓoss(θˆ,
[
X Y
]
) to denote the “scaled up” value of the Lasso’s loss
ℓoss(θˆ,
[
X Y
]
) =
∥∥∥Y −X × θˆ∥∥∥2
2
+ 2 · λ ·
∥∥∥θˆ∥∥∥
1
.
It is known (Wainwright, 2009), as described in the following theorem, that the Lasso estimator with
proper parameters provably finds the correct set of features, if the dataset and noise vectors are sampled
from normal distributions.
Theorem 2.1 (Wainwright (2009)). Let X be a dataset sampled from N (0, 1/4)n×p and W be a noise
vector sampled from N (0, σ2)n. For any θ∗ ∈ (0, 1)p with at most s number of non-zero coordinates,
for λ = 4σ
√
n× log(p) and n = ω(s · log(p)), with probability at least 3/4 over the choice of X and
W (that determine Y as well) we have Supp(θˆ) = Supp(θ∗) where θˆ = Lasso(
[
X Y
]
). Moreover, θˆ is
a unique minimizer for ℓoss(·, [X Y ]).
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The above theorem requires the dataset to be sampled from a certain distribution and does not take
into account the possibilities of outliers in the data. The robust version of this theorem, where part of
the training data is chosen by an adversary, is also studied in the context of differential privacy. The
following theorem by Thakurta & Smith (2013) states that if an adversary changes up to O˜(
√
n) of the
examples, the Lasso estimator still finds the right set of coordinates with high probability.
Theorem 2.2 (Thakurta & Smith (2013)). Let X be a dataset sampled from N (0, 1/4)n×p and W be
a noise vector sampled from N (0, σ2)n. For any θ∗ ∈ (0, 1)p, if λ = 4σ√n× log(p) and n =
ω(s log(p) + s4 · k2), with probability at least 3/4 over the choice of X,W (determining Y ), and
Y = X × θ∗ + W it holds that, adding any set of k labeled vectors [X ′ Y ′], such that rows of X ′
has ℓ∞ norm at most 1 and Y has ℓ∞ norm at most s, to
[
X Y
]
would not change the support set of the
model recovered by Lasso estimator. Namely,
Supp
(
Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
]))
= Supp(Lasso(
[
X Y
]
) = Supp(θ∗).
More general version of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 are provided in the appendix. Theorem A.2 which is a
generalization of Theorem 2.1, specifies some sufficient conditions for a dataset X that will make Lasso
estimator to find the correct features. Similarly, Theorem 2.2 is a generalization of Theorem A.2 that
shows sufficient conditions for X that will make Lasso estimator to find the correct features in a robust
way. Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 are instantiating of these generalized theorems for normal distribution and
are proved by showing that the sufficient conditions will happen with high probability.
3 Oblivious and Full-information Poisoning: Defining Threat Models
In this section, we formally define the security of model recovery under poisoning attacks. It is com-
mon in cryptography to define security model based on a game between an adversary and a challenger
(Katz & Lindell, 2007). Here, we use the same approach and introduce two game based definitions for
oblivious and full-information adversaries. The definitions are tailored for model recovery setting and
Lasso, but they could be directly generalized to other learners as well. Later, in Section 4 we will see
how to construct a problem that separates these two definitions and show that oblivious attacks are prov-
ably weaker. The following game captures the security of model recovery against oblivious poisoning
adversaries who have to select poison examples based only on the knowledge of the model trained on the
honestly sampled (but still noisy) data.
Definition 3.1 (Oblivious poisoning). The game is between a challenger C and an adversary A.
OblivGame(k,
[
X Y
]
):
1. C recovers model θˆ = Lasso(
[
X Y
]
) and sends it to the adversary A.
2. Adversary A finds a poisoning dataset
[
X ′ Y ′
] ∈ Rk×(p+1) of size k such that each row of X ′
has ℓ1 norm at most 1 and Y
′ has ℓ∞ norm at most 1. Then, A sends
[
X ′ Y ′
]
to C .
3. C recovers θˆ′ = Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
and sends it to the adversary.
4. Adversary wins if Supp(θˆ) 6= Supp(θˆ′).
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Remark 3.2 (Variations of threat model). In Definition 3.1, Since we are focusing on oblivious setting,
we only allow the adversary to add malicious data. One can, however, define more specific goals for the
attacker to violate the model recovery, by specifically aiming to add, or remove, non-zero coordinates to
the recovered model compared to the ground truth. Such adversaries can be seen as “targeted” variants
of the adversary of Definition 3.1, and even more targeted variants could be envisioned where specific
features are aimed to be added to or dropped from the recovered model. Generally, the winning condition
for the adversary could be any predicate over the resulting model. On the other direction, one can directly
obtain more general definitions compared to Definition 3.1, by allowing more general problems of model
recovery and even study oblivious attacks for other type of learning problems beyond model recovery.
We now define a more powerful poisoning adversary who gets to see the whole dataset and then
crafts the poisoning points based on the “clean points” in the dataset. We call this strong adversarial
model the full-information model which is defined in the following game.
Definition 3.3 (Full-information poisoning). The following game is between a challenger C and an
adversary A. (The different part compared to Definition 3.1 is denoted by purple color.)
FullInfGame(k,
[
X Y
]
):
1. C sends
[
X Y
]
to A.
2. Adversary A finds a poisoning dataset
[
X ′ Y ′
] ∈ Rk×(p+1) of size k such that each row of X ′
has ℓ1 norm bounded by 1 and Y
′ has ℓ∞ norm bounded by 1 and sends
[
X ′ Y ′
]
to C .
3. C recovers θ′ = Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
and sends it to the adversary.
4. Adversary wins if Supp(θˆ′) 6= Supp(θˆ).
Remark 3.4. Note that in both Definitions 3.1 and 3.3 we have restricted the power of adversary by both
the number of examples that could be added, and also the ℓ1 norm of each added example. Note that this
restriction is different from the restriction of Theorem 2.2 that restricts the ℓ∞ norm of added examples.
The reason we define the adversary differently is because our separation only works in the ℓ1 setting and
the separation of oblivious and full-information adversaries with bounded ℓ∞ budget remains open.
4 Separating the Power of Oblivious and Full-information Poisoning
In this section, we will provably demonstrate that the power of oblivious and full-information adversaries
could significantly differ. More specifically, we construct a model recovery problem (by specifying the
distribution of its components) such that, with high probability, it stays secure in the oblivious attack
model of Definition 3.1, while the same problem’s setting is highly vulnerable to poisoning adversaries
as defined in the full-information threat model of Definition 3.3.
Main idea behind construction: To prove the separation, we use the fact that oblivious adversaries
cannot discriminate between the coordinates that are not in the support set of θ∗. Specifically, if there is
a single unstable coordinate i 6∈ Supp(θ∗) that can be attacked with small number of poisoning points,
because of excessively noisy values in dataset, then the oblivious adversary would not be able to find
this coordinate simply because he does not see the dataset. Therefore he should attack blindly and pick
one of the coordinates at random. On the other hand, the full-information adversary can investigate the
dataset and find the unstable feature.
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In the rest of the section, we first show two properties of a dataset
[
X Y
]
that if hold, we can prove
separation. Then we will show how to instantiate a dataset with those two properties by changing a
dataset that is sampled from a Gaussian distribution. The first notion divides the columns of data to
stable and unstable features based on the number of poisoning points required to remove or add those
features from or to the support set of the resulting model.
Definition 4.1 (Stable and unstable coordinates). Consider a dataset
[
X Y
] ∈ Rn×(p+1) with a unique
solution for the Lasso minimization.
[
X Y
]
is k-unstable on coordinate i ∈ [p] if its ith coordinate of
model learn on it is 0, namely Lasso
([
X Y
])
i
= 0 and there exist a data set
[
X ′ Y ′
]
with size k and
ℓ1 norm at most 1 on each row such that
i ∈ Supp
(
Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
]))
.
On the other hand,
[
X Y
]
is k-stable on a coordinate i, if for all datasets
[
X ′ Y ′
]
with k rows and ℓ1
norm at most 1 on each row we either have
Lasso
([
X Y
])
i
= Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
i
= 0 or Lasso(
[
X Y
]
)i · Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
i
> 0.
Now we show how to use a dataset with only one k-unstable feature and prove the separation. The
core idea is to shuffle the columns and prevent the adversary from finding the unstable coordinate. The
adversary who does not know which of the coordinates is unstable cannot perform the attack but an
adversary with the knowledge of the unstable coordinate can add poisoning points and cause the unstable
coordinate to be added to the support set. The following definition captures the property of a dataset that
adding the unstable feature is hard unless the adversary knows which feature is unstable.
Definition 4.2 ((k, ǫ)-resilience). Consider a dataset
[
X Y
] ∈ Rn×(p+1) with a unique solution for the
Lasso minimization and let T = Supp(Lasso(
[
X Y
]
)). Also, let G be the set of all permutations that
are fixed on T namely, G = {π : [p]→ [p] | ∀i ∈ T ;π(i) = i}. We say [X Y ] is (k, ǫ)-resilient if for
any dataset
[
X ′ Y ′
]
with k rows with ℓ1 norm at most 1, we have
Pr
pi←G
[
Supp
(
Lasso
([
X Y
π(X ′) Y ′
]))
6= T
]
≤ ǫ,
where π(X ′) is the matrix produced by permuting the columns of X ′ according to π.
Now we state and prove the following theorem that separates the notion of oblivious and full-
information poisoning attacks. This theorem assumes the existence of a (k, ǫ)-resilient dataset that is
k-stable on all but one feature.
Theorem 4.3 (Separating oblivious and full-information adversaries). Consider a dataset
[
X Y
]
that
is (k, ǫ)-resilient and k-stable on all the coordinates except on 1 coordinate that is k-unstable. Suppose
the challenger takes this dataset and randomly shuffles the coordinates according to a permutation π to
get π(X) and uses the dataset
[
π(X) Y
]
to run the Lasso estimator. Then, the probability of winning
for an oblivious adversary in the security game of Definition 3.1 is at most ǫ, while a full-information
adversary can win the security game of Definition 3.3 with probability 1.
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Remark 4.4. Note that in Theorem 4.5 the full information adversary is an “information-theoretic”
adversary. In particular, the the theorem states that the full-information adversary has all the information
that is required to find the unstable coordinate and also the poisoning dataset that would result in adding
the unstable coordinate. Finding the right set of poisoning examples might be computationally hard but
that is not an issue since we are dealing with information theoretic adversaries. Specifically, since we do
not put any restriction on time complexity, all the adversary has to do is to try all possible combinations
of poisoning datasets and find the one that will add the unstable coordinate to the model. However, for
Construction 4.6 in next section, we not require the full-information adversary to be computationally
unbounded and its running time is O(p).
Proof of Theorem 4.5. We first show that winning the full-information game of Definition 3.3 is always
possible. After getting the dataset
[
X Y
]
the adversary inspects the dataset to find out which coordinate
is unstable and find a poisoning dataset that would add that unstable coordinate to the support set of the
model.
Now we show that no adversary can win the oblivious security game of Definition 3.1 with proba-
bility more than ǫ. The intuition behind this claim is the symmetric nature of the Lasso estimator—by
permuting the rows of a dataset
[
X Y
]
to
[
π(X) Y
]
the Lasso would output the same output with
permuted coordinates. Namely, Lasso(
[
π(X) Y
]
) = π(Lasso(
[
X Y
]
)).
Now, let π be the permutation chosen by the challenger and let θˆ = Lasso(
[
X Y
]
) and let T =
Supp(θˆ). Adversary receives π(θ) and generates a poisoning dataset
[
X ′ Y ′
]
. Let A(π(θˆ)) denote
the potentially randomized algorithm that the adversary uses to generate the poison data, and let G =
{π : [p] → [p] | ∀i ∈ T ;π(i) = i}. Now we use (k, ǫ)-resiliency of [X Y ] to argue about the proba-
bility of an oblivious adversary winning the game. The high level idea is that because the oblivious
adversary cannot discriminate between zero coordinates, he cannot find the right ordering of coordinates
with a high probability.
Pr
pi←Sp
[X′|Y ′]←A(pi(θˆ))
[
Lasso
([
π(X) Y
X ′ Y ′
])
6= T
]
= Pr
pi←Sp,pi′←G
[X′|Y ′]←A(pi(pi′(θˆ)))
[
Lasso
([
π(π′(X)) Y
X ′ Y ′
])
6= T
]
= Pr
pi←Sp,pi′←G
[X′|Y ′]←A(pi(θˆ))
[
Lasso
([
π(π′(X)) Y
X ′ Y ′
])
6= T
]
= Pr
pi←Sp,pi′←G
[X′|Y ′]←A(pi(θˆ))
[
Lasso
([
X Y
π′−1(π−1(X ′)) Y ′
])
6= T
]
= Pr
pi←Sp,pi′←G
[X′|Y ′]←A(pi(θˆ))
[
Lasso
([
X Y
π′(π(X ′)) Y ′
])
6= T
]
≤ ǫ.
Therefore, the proof of Theorem 4.3 is complete.
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4.1 Constructing the Dataset
Now we move on to constructing a dataset that is k-stable on all but one coordinate and is (k, ǫ)-resilient.
What values of k can we use? Before constructing the dataset, lets first see what values of k we can
use to prove separation. The following theorem states that if k > ω(λ) even an oblivious adversary
can add any non-relevant feature to the support set of resulting model. Therefore, in our separation, we
are interested in values of k = o(λ) as we know for k = ω(λ) both the oblivious and full-information
adversaries have almost full advantage.
Theorem 4.5. Let X ∈ Rn×p be an arbitrary matrix, θ∗ ∈ [0, 1]p be an arbitrary vector, W be a noise
vector sampled from N (0, σ2)n×1, and let Y = X × θ∗ +W . Also let λ be the penalty parameter that
is used for Lasso. For any i ∈ [p], there is an oblivious adversary that adds k = 2λ labeled examples[
X ′ Y ′
]
with ℓ1 norm at most 1 such that
i ∈ Supp
(
Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
]))
.
Theorem 4.5 shows that there are oblivious adversaries that use budget 2λ and add non-relevant fea-
tures to the model independent of what distribution the dataset is sampled from. On the other hand, based
on Theorem 2.2 we know that if the data is sampled from Gaussian distribution, for λ = O(
√
n), the
Lasso estimator is robust against full-information adversaries with budget O(
√
n). Theorem 4.5 which
shows the almost tightness of the robustness bounds of Theorem 2.2 makes Gaussian distribution not
suitable for separating full-information and oblivious adversaries. Following, we show that by tweaking
the Gaussian distribution we can achieve the separation.
Construction 4.6. Consider a vector θ∗ ∈ Rp with first s coordinates having non-zero values and last
p − s coordinates are equal to 0. Let λ = 4σ√n× p and k < λ such that n ≥ s · log(p) + s4 · k2. We
construct a dataset [
X Y
]
=
[
X0 Y0
X1 Y1
]
∈ R(n+λ−k)×p
whereX0 is generated by first sampling fromN (0, 1/4)n×p and setting the last coordinate to 0. Namely
X0 =


N (0, 1) . . . N (0, 1) 0
...
. . .
...
...
N (0, 1) . . . N (0, 1) 0

 and Y0 = X0 × θ∗ +W
forW is the noise vector sampled from N (0, σ2)n.
X1 ∈ R(λ−k)×p whose all elements are equal to 0 except the last coordinate that 1 and Y1 is a vector
that is equal to 1 everywhere. Namely,
X1 =


0 . . . 0 1
...
. . .
...
...
0 . . . 0 1

 and Y1 =


1
...
1

 .
Now we prove that the dataset of Construction 4.6 has all the required properties of Theorem 4.5.
First show that Lasso estimator can recover θ∗ from the dataset
[
X Y
]
of Construction 4.6.
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Claim 4.7. Let
[
X Y
]
=
[
X0 Y0
X1 Y1
]
be the dataset of Construction 4.6. With probability at least 3/4
over the choice of X0 andW in Construction 4.6, ℓoss(·,
[
X Y
]
) has a unique minimizer and we have
Supp(Lasso(
[
X Y
]
)) = Supp(θ∗).
In addition, we have
Lasso(
[
X Y
]
)) = Lasso(
[
X0 Y0
]
).
Nowwe show that the dataset of Construction 4.6 is k-stable on all features except the last coordinate.
Claim 4.8. With probability at least 3/4 over the choice of X0 andW0. The dataset [X,Y ] of construc-
tion 4.6 is k-stable on all but the first p− 1 coordinates and is k-unstable on the last coordinate.
And finally we show the the dataset of Construction 4.6 is (k, ǫ)-resilient.
Claim 4.9. Let
[
X Y
]
=
[
X0 Y0
X1 Y1
]
be the dataset of Construction 4.6. With probability at least
3/4 over the choice of X0 and W in Construction 4.6,
[
X Y
]
is (k, (1+q)
2
p−s )-resilient, where q =
maxi∈[p](
∣∣Lasso ([X0 Y0])i∣∣).
Note that in Claim 4.9, the value of q would be at most 1. This is because Lasso estimator would
always output a model θˆ in (0, 1)p. Moreover, since (X0, Y0) is sampled from a Gaussian setting of
Theorem distribution, q would be very close to maxi∈[p] θ
∗
i as well. This is because that is very close to
θ∗ in ℓ2 norm. Since θ
∗ ∈ (0, 1)p and q cannot be much larger than 1, for large enough n.
Remark 4.10 (Generalization of Construction 4.6). In Construction 4.6, the feature matrixX0 is sampled
from Normal distribution. The reason behind this is because we need the sampled dataset to be suitable
for Lasso estimator. In particular, based on Theorem 2.1 and 2.2, we know that sampling from Normal
distribution would generate a “good” dataset for Lasso estimator to robustly recover the correct feature
set, with high probability. The specifications of a “good” dataset for Lasso are explained in Theorems
A.2 and A.2 in appendix. We can build the dataset of Construction 4.6 based on any feature matrix X0
that satisfies these conditions. This means that sampling from Gaussian is not necessary and as long as
X0 is “good”, one can prove the separation.
4.2 Proofs of Theorem 4.5, Claim 4.7, Claim 4.8 and Claim 4.9
We first state and prove the following useful lemma.
Lemma 4.11. Let X ∈ Rn×p and Y ∈ Rn. Let θˆ be a vector that minimizes ℓoss(·, [X Y ]). Then, for
all non-zero coordinates j ∈ [p], where θˆj 6= 0 we have
n∑
i=1
X(i,j) · (Yi − 〈θˆ, Xi〉) = −λ · Sign(θˆj),
and for all 0 coordinates j ∈ [p], where θj = 0, we have∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
X(i,j) · (Yi − 〈θˆ, Xi〉)
∣∣∣∣∣ < λ.
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Proof. Proof of Theorem 4.5 Since θˆ is a minimizer of f(·), the derivative of f should be 0 or undefined
on all coordinates at θˆ. Note that, for all non-zero coordinates i the derivative of the second term 2λ ‖θ‖1
is equal to 2λSign(θi). Therefore, for non-zero coordinates the derivative of the first term should be
equal to −2λ · Sign(θi). That is,
2(XT × (Y −X × θˆ))i = 2λ · Sign(θi)
which proves the first part of the lemma. For the second part, note that the derivative of f does not exist,
but the left-hand and right-hand derivatives exist and θˆ minimizes f . Therefore, the left-derivative should
be negative and the right hand derivative should be positive. Thus, we have
2(XT × (Y −X × θˆ))i + 2λ > 0,
and
2(XT × (Y −X × θˆ))i − 2λ < 0,
which implies that
−λ ≤ (XT × (Y −X × θˆ))i < λ,
finishing the proof of the lemma.
Now, we prove Theorem 4.5 and show how to construct the poisoning dataset by using the lemma
above.
Proof of Theorem 4.5. ConsiderX ′ which is a k×pmatrix that is 0 everywhere except on the ith column
that is 1 and Y ′ is a k × 1 vector that is equal to 1 everywhere. We show that by adding this matrix the
adversary is able to add ith coordinate to the support set of the θˆ′ = Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
. To prove this,
suppose the ith coordinate of θˆ′ is 0. Thus, we have([
X
X ′
]T
×
([
Y
Y ′
]
−
[
X
X ′
]
× θˆ′
))
i
= k +
(
XT × (Y −X × θˆ′)
)
i
. (1)
Now we prove that θˆ′ also minimizes the Lasso loss over
[
X Y
]
. This is because for any vector θ
with ith coordinate 0, we have
ℓoss
(
θ,
[
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
= k + ℓoss(θ,
[
X Y
]
).
Now, let θˆ be the minimizer of ℓoss(·, [X Y ]). We know that θˆ is 0 on the ith coordinate. Therefore we
have,
ℓoss
(
θˆ,
[
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
= k + ℓoss
(
θˆ,
[
X Y
])
≥ ℓoss
(
θˆ′,
[
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
= k + ℓoss(θˆ′,
[
X Y
]
). (2)
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where the last inequality comes from the fact that θˆ′ minimizes the loss over
[
X Y
X ′ Y ′
]
. On the other
hand, we know that
ℓoss(θˆ′,
[
X Y
]
) ≥ ℓoss(θˆ, [X Y ]) (3)
because θˆ minimizes ℓoss(·, [X Y ]). Inequalities 2 and 3 imply that
ℓoss(θˆ,
[
X Y
]
) = ℓoss(θˆ′,
[
X Y
]
)
and that θˆ′ minimizes ℓoss(·, [X Y ]). Therefore, based on Lemma 4.11, since the ith coordinate of θˆ′
is zero we have ∣∣∣(XT × (Y −X × θˆ))i∣∣∣ ≤ λ. (4)
Combining Equations 1 and 4 we have∣∣∣∣∣
[
X
X ′
]T ([
Y
Y ′
]
−
[
X
X ′
]
× θˆ
)
i
∣∣∣∣∣ > λ.
This, however, is a contradiction because of Lemma 4.11 and the fact that the ith coordinate is zero.
Hence, the ith coordinate could not be 0 and the proof is complete.
Proof of Claim 4.7. We first prove the uniqueness property. Let X ′0 be the first p − 1 columns of X0.
Suppose there are two solutions θˆ1 and θˆ2 for Lasso on
[
X Y
]
. We show that
[
X ′0 Y0
]
has two solutions
as well. We first observe that the last coordinates of θˆ1 and θˆ2 should both be 0. This is because of the
fact that for any θ, we have ∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
X(i,p) · (Yi − 〈θˆ, Xi〉)
∣∣∣∣∣ = |λ− k| < λ
which by Lemma 4.11 implies that the last coordinate for any Lasso solution should be 0. Now let θˆ′1
and θˆ′2 be the first p − 1 coordinates of θˆ1 and θˆ2 respectively. We show that θˆ′1 and θˆ′2 both minimize
ℓoss(·, [X ′0 Y0]). We have
ℓoss(θˆ0,
[
X Y
]
) = ℓoss(θˆ0,
[
X0 Y0
]
+ ℓoss(θˆ0,
[
X1 Y1
]
)− 2λ ·
∥∥∥θˆ0∥∥∥
1
(since (θˆ0)p is 0) = ℓoss(θˆ
′
0,
[
X ′0 Y0
]
+ ℓoss(θˆ0,
[
X1 Y1
]− 2λ · ∥∥∥θˆ0∥∥∥
1
= ℓoss(θˆ′0,
[
X ′0 Y0
]
+ λ− k + 2λ ·
∥∥∥θˆ0∥∥∥
1
− 2λ ·
∥∥∥θˆ0∥∥∥
1
Similarly, we have
ℓoss(θˆ′1,
[
X,Y )
]
= ℓoss(θˆ′1,
[
X ′0 Y0
]
+ λ− k
which implies
ℓoss(θˆ′0,
[
X ′0 Y
]
) = ℓoss(θˆ′1,
[
X ′0 Y
]
)
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and they both minimize ℓoss(·, [X ′0 Y0]).
Now note that
[
X ′0 Y0
]
have all the properties of Theorem 2.1 and we have
[
X ′0 Y0
]
with probability
at least 3/4 has a unique Lasso solution. Therefore, the Lasso solution for
[
X Y
]
is also unique with
probability at least 3/4. Also note that this unique solution would have the correct support set as
[
X ′0 Y0
]
would have the correct support set based on Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Cliam 4.8. We first show the k-unstability of the last coordinate. Consider a poisoning dataset[
X ′ Y ′
] ∈ Rp, where
X ′ =


0 . . . 0 1
...
. . .
...
...
0 . . . 0 1

 and Y ′ =


1
...
1

 .
We prove that p ∈ Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
. Suppose this is not the case and we have zero pth corodinate
namely, Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
p
= 0. We have
∣∣∣∣∣
n+λ∑
i=1
X(i,p) · (Yi − 〈θˆ, Xi〉)
∣∣∣∣∣ = λ.
This is contradictory with Lemma 4.11 that states this value should be less than λ because the pth coor-
dinate is 0. Therefore, the pth coordinate is in the support set.
Now, we focus on proving the k-stability of all other coordinates. Suppose by adding a subset[
X ′ Y ′
]
to
[
X Y
]
and we get a model θˆ′ = Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
that is non-zero on the ith coordinate
for some p > i > s. The idea is to build a poisoning dataset
[
X ′′ Y ′′
] ∈ Rk×p that when added to[
X0 Y0
]
causes the ith coordinate to be added to the support set. Let X ′′ be the same matrix as X ′
except the last column that is set to 0. Namely,
X ′′ =


X ′(1,1) . . . X
′
(1,p−1) 0
...
. . .
...
...
X ′(k,1) . . . X
′
(k,p−1) 0

 and Y ′′ = Y ′ − (X ′ −X ′′)× θˆ′
We prove that i ∈ Supp
(
Lasso
([
X0 Y0
X ′′ Y ′′
]))
. Note that if we prove this, the proof would be com-
plete as we know that [X0, Y0] is k-stable for all coordinates with probability at least 3/4 based on
Theorem 2.2 (Note that similar to the proof of Claim 4.7, the fact that the last coordinate of X0 is not
sampled from Gaussian would not cause any issue). However, there is one subtle issue that might happen
here, if the ℓ∞ norm of Y
′′ might be larger than s, then the guarantee of theorem 2.2 does not hold
anymore. But that will not happen because we restrict the ℓ∞ norm of Y
′ to be at most 1 and the fact that
ℓ∞ norm of θˆ
′ is at most 1 based on the way lasso estimator is defined. This means that the ℓ∞ norm of
14
Y ′′ is at most 2. Let θˆ′′ ∈ Rp be equal to θˆ′ everywhere except on the last coordinate that is equal to 0.
We have
ℓoss
(
θˆ′′,
[
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥

Y0Y1
Y ′

−

X0X1
X ′

× θˆ′
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
+ 2 · λ ·
∥∥∥θˆ′∥∥∥
1
=
∥∥∥Y0 −X0 × θˆ′′∥∥∥2
2
+ |(λ− k)(1 − θˆ′p)2|
+
∥∥∥Y ′ −X ′ × θˆ′∥∥∥2
2
+ 2 · λ ·
∥∥∥θˆ′′∥∥∥
1
+ 2λ · |θˆ′p|
Now based on the way X ′′, Y ′′ and θ′′ are defined we have Y ′′ −X ′′ × θ′′ = Y ′ −X ′ × θ′. Therefore,
ℓoss
(
θˆ′,
[
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
=
∥∥∥∥
[
Y0
Y ′′
]
−
[
X0
X ′′
]
× θˆ′′
∥∥∥∥
2
2
+ |(λ− k)(1 − θˆ′p)2|+ 2 · λ ·
∥∥∥θˆ′′∥∥∥
1
+ 2λ · |θˆ′p|
= ℓoss
(
θˆ′′,
[
X0 Y0
X ′′ Y ′′
])
+ |(λ− k)(1 − θˆ′p)2|+ 2λ · |θˆ′p|
This means in order for θˆ′ to minimize ℓoss
(
·,
[
X Y
X ′ Y ′
])
, the parameter θˆ′′ should also minimize
ℓoss
(
·,
[
X0 Y0
X ′′ Y ′′
])
. This means that θ′′ = Lasso
([
X0 Y0
X ′′ Y ′′
])
has the ith column in its support.
Hence the proof is complete.
Proof of Claim 4.9. Suppose by adding a poisoning dataset
[
X ′ Y ′
]
to
[
X Y
]
the pth coordinate would
be added to the support of the solution. Namely, p ∈ Supp(θˆ′) for θˆ′ = Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
]
)
)
. Now let
[
X ′′ Y ′′
]
=
[
X Y
X ′ Y ′
]
∈ R(n+λ)×(p+1).
Based on Lemma 4.11, we have
n+k∑
i=1
X ′′(i,p) · (Y ′′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′′i 〉) = λ · Sign(θˆ′p). (5)
Based on the way the dataset is constructed, we have
n+λ∑
i=1
X ′′(i,p) · (Y ′′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′′i 〉)
=
n∑
i=1
X ′′(i,p) · (Y ′′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′′i 〉) +
n+λ−k∑
i=n+1
X ′′(i,p) · (Y ′′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′′i 〉) +
k∑
i=1
X ′(i,p) · (Y ′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′i〉)
= 0 + (λ− k) · (1− θˆ′p) +
k∑
i=1
X ′(i,p) · (Y ′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′i〉). (6)
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Therefore by combining 5 and 6 we have
|
k∑
i=1
X ′(i,p) · (Y ′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′i〉)| = |λSign(θˆ′p)− (λ− k)(1− θˆ′p)| > k. (7)
Now consider the quantity
∑k
i=1 |Y ′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′i〉|2. First note that we have
k∑
i=1
|Y ′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′i〉|2 ≤
k∑
i=1
|Y ′i − 〈θˆ′′,X ′i〉|2
where θˆ = Lasso(
[
X Y
]
). This is correct because otherwise θˆ′′ would have smaller loss than θˆ′. By
Claim 4.7 we know that θˆ = θˆ′′ which implies
k∑
i=1
|Y ′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′i〉|2 ≤
k∑
i=1
|Y ′i − 〈θˆ, X ′i〉|2.
On the other hand we have
k∑
i=1
|Y ′i − 〈θˆ, X ′i〉|2 ≤
k∑
i=1
(1 + q|Xi|)2 ≤ k(1 + q)2 (8)
which in turn implies
k∑
i=1
|Y ′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′i〉|2 ≤ k(1 + q)2. (9)
Now by Cauchy–Schwarz inequality we have
(
k∑
i=1
|Y ′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′i〉|2
)
·
(
k∑
i=1
X ′2(i,p)
)
>
(
k∑
i=1
|Y ′i − 〈θˆ′,X ′i〉| ·X ′(i,p)
)2
. (10)
Combining inequalities 10, 7 and 9 we get
k∑
i=1
X ′2(i,p) > k/(1 + q)
2. (11)
This means that the average of last coordinate of X ′ should have most of the weight of the whole
matrix. In particular, since X ′(i,j) < 1 for all (i, j) we have
k∑
i=1
|X ′(i,p)| > k/(1 + q)2.
Also since each row in X ′ have ℓ1 norm bounded by 1, we have
k∑
i=1
p∑
j=1
|X ′(i,p)| ≤ k.
16
This implies that number of columns j for which
k∑
i=1
|X ′(i,j)| > k/(1 + q)2.
holds is at most (1+ q)2. Therefore, for any
[
X ′ Y ′
]
the probability of π(
[
X ′ Y ′
]
) having sum at least
k over the last column is at most (1 + q)2/(p − s). This means the probability of π(X ′) adding the pth
column to the support set would be at most (1 + q2)/(p − s).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we initiated a formal study of the power of oblivious adversaries who do not have any
information about the training set in comparison with full-information adversaries who know the training
data completely before adding poison points to it.
Our main result proved a separation between the two threat models by constructing a sparse linear
regression problem for which Lasso estimator is robust against oblivious adversaries that aim to add
a non-relevant features to the model with certain poisoning budget. On the other hand, for the same
problem, we prove that full-information adversaries, with the same budget, can find specific poisoning
examples based on the rest of the training data in such a way that they can successfully add non-relevant
features to the model. Our work sheds light on an important and yet subtle aspect of modeling the threat
posed by poisoning adversaries.
Another contribution of our work was to study poisoning attacks in the context of model recovery
and for a sparse linear regression problem, where the goal of the adversary is something different from
increasing the population risk (or failure probability on a particular example).
For future work, a general direction is to explicitly study other subtle aspects of poisoning attacks
that are implicit in previous work. A specific direction is to study the power of oblivious poisoning
attacks when the goal of the adversary is to increase the population risk or the probability of a bad
event (i.e., targeted poisoning) as these are the most common goals of poisoning attacks studied in the
literature. Specifically, consider a bad property B over the hypothesis class H, and a learning algorithm
L : Zn →H. Does there exist a distribution D over Zn and a poisoning size p such that
max
A∈{f : H→Zp}
Pr
T←D;
h←L(T );
T ′←A(h)
[
B
(
L
([
T
T ′
]))
= 1
]
is much smaller than
max
A∈{f : Zn→Zp}
Pr
T←D;
T ′←A(T )
[
B
(
L
([
T
T ′
]))
= 1
]
.
Finally, as discussed in the introduction, our results show that online adversaries who only know the
training data till a particular point in time, fall somewhere between full information and oblivious attacks.
Can we formalize such attacks for model recovery and prove that they are more/less powerful than either
of full information or oblivious settings?
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A Sufficient Conditions for Model Recovery Using Lasso
In this section, we specify the sufficient conditions for a dataset that makes it a good dataset for ro-
bust recover using Lasso estimator. We borrow these specifications from the work of Thakurta & Smith
(2013).
Definition A.1 (Typical systems). Suppose θ∗ ∈ [0, 1]p be a model such that |Supp(θ∗)| = s. Let
X ∈ Rn×p and Y ∈ Rn×1 and W = Y − X × θ∗. Also let XI ∈ Rn×s be a matrix formed by
columns of X whose indices are in Supp(θ∗) and XO ∈ Rn×(p−s) be a matrix formed by columns of X
whose indices are not in Supp(θ∗). The pair (θ∗,
[
X Y
]
) is called an (n, p, s, ψ, σ)-typical system, if
the following hold:
• Column normalization: Each column of X has ℓ2 norm bounded by
√
n.
• Incoherence: ∥∥((XTOXI)(XTI XI)−1sign(θ∗))∥∥∞ ≤ 1/4.
• Restricted strong restricted: The minimum eigenvalue of XIXTI is at least ψ.
• Bounded noise ∥∥XTO(In×n −XI(XTI XI)−1XTI )W∥∥∞ ≤ 2σ√n log(p).
The following theorem is a modified version of result ofWainwright (2009) borrowed from Thakurta & Smith
(2013).
Theorem A.2 (Model recovery with Lasso Wainwright (2009)). Let (θ∗,
[
X Y
]
) be a (n, p, s, σ, ψ)-
typical system. Let α = argmini∈pmax(θ
∗
i , 1 − θ∗i ). If n ≥ 16 · σψ·α
√
s · log(p) and then θˆ =
Lasso(
[
X Y
]
) would have the same support as θ∗ when λ = 4σ
√
n · log(p).
The following theorem is about robust model recovery with Lasso in Thakurta & Smith (2013).
Theorem A.3 (Robust model recovery with Lasso Thakurta & Smith (2013)). Let (θ∗,
[
X Y
]
) be a
(n, p, s, σ, ψ)-typical system. Let α = argmini∈pmax(θ
∗
i , 1− θ∗i ). If
n ≥ max( 16σ
ψ · α
√
s · log(p), 4s
4k2(1/ψ + 1)2
log(p)σ2
)
then θˆ = Lasso(
[
X Y
]
) would have the same support as θ∗ when λ = 4σ
√
n · log(p).
In addition, adding any set of k labeled vectors
[
X ′ Y ′
]
with ℓ∞ norm at most 1 to
[
X Y
]
would
not change the support set of the model recovered by Lasso estimator. Namely,
Supp
(
Lasso
([
X Y
X ′ Y ′
]))
= Supp(Lasso(
[
X Y
]
) = Supp(θ∗).
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